RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT(3) OpenSSL RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT(3)
NAME
RSA_public_encrypt, RSA_private_decrypt - RSA public key cryptography
SYNOPSIS
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
DESCRIPTION
RSA_public_encrypt() encrypts the flen bytes at from (usually a session
key) using the public key rsa and stores the ciphertext in to. to must
point to RSA_size(rsa) bytes of memory.
padding denotes one of the following modes:
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
PKCS #1 v1.5 padding. This currently is the most widely used mode.
However, it is highly recommended to use RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING in
new applications. SEE WARNING BELOW.
RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING
EME-OAEP as defined in PKCS #1 v2.0 with SHA-1, MGF1 and an empty
encoding parameter. This mode is recommended for all new
applications.
RSA_SSLV23_PADDING
PKCS #1 v1.5 padding with an SSL-specific modification that denotes
that the server is SSL3 capable.
RSA_NO_PADDING
Raw RSA encryption. This mode should only be used to implement
cryptographically sound padding modes in the application code.
Encrypting user data directly with RSA is insecure.
When encrypting flen must not be more than RSA_size(rsa) - 11 for the
PKCS #1 v1.5 based padding modes, not more than RSA_size(rsa) - 42 for
RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING and exactly RSA_size(rsa) for RSA_NO_PADDING.
When a padding mode other than RSA_NO_PADDING is in use, then
RSA_public_encrypt() will include some random bytes into the ciphertext
and therefore the ciphertext will be different each time, even if the
plaintext and the public key are exactly identical. The returned
ciphertext in to will always be zero padded to exactly RSA_size(rsa)
bytes. to and from may overlap.
RSA_private_decrypt() decrypts the flen bytes at from using the private
key rsa and stores the plaintext in to. flen should be equal to
RSA_size(rsa) but may be smaller, when leading zero bytes are in the
ciphertext. Those are not important and may be removed, but
RSA_public_encrypt() does not do that. to must point to a memory
section large enough to hold the maximal possible decrypted data (which
is equal to RSA_size(rsa) for RSA_NO_PADDING, RSA_size(rsa) - 11 for
the PKCS #1 v1.5 based padding modes and RSA_size(rsa) - 42 for
RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING). padding is the padding mode that was used to
encrypt the data. to and from may overlap.
RETURN VALUES
RSA_public_encrypt() returns the size of the encrypted data (i.e.,
RSA_size(rsa)). RSA_private_decrypt() returns the size of the recovered
plaintext. A return value of 0 is not an error and means only that the
plaintext was empty.
On error, -1 is returned; the error codes can be obtained by
ERR_get_error(3).
WARNINGS
Decryption failures in the RSA_PKCS1_PADDING mode leak information
which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher padding oracle
attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1 v1.5 padding
design. Prefer RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING.
In OpenSSL before version 3.1.0, both the return value and the length
of returned value could be used to mount the Bleichenbacher attack.
Since version 3.1.0, OpenSSL does not return an error in case of
padding checks failed. Instead it generates a random message based on
used private key and provided ciphertext so that application code
doesn't have to implement a side-channel secure error handling.
CONFORMING TO
SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0
SEE ALSO
ERR_get_error(3), RAND_bytes(3), RSA_size(3)
COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
1.1.1k 2024-10-09 RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT(3)